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The 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis upset the traditional alliances of the Middle East. 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt severed ties with Qatar, 
accusing Qatar of sponsoring terrorist organizations and compromising the Gulf Cooperation 
Council by strengthening relations with Iran. This article highlights the role of the Muslim 
Brotherhood within both Saudi Arabia and Qatar to demonstrate why the Islamist 
organization was an important piece in the initiation of the ongoing diplomatic crisis. Using 
two historical case studies, this paper reveals two divergent views of the MB in Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar. The Saudi royal family views the MB as a threat to their authority because of their 
religious ideology and pro-democratic stance. The Qataris, conversely, favor the MB because 
of their foreign policy goals to become a global actor that involves the MB. Survey data from 
the Arab Barometer IV connects views on the MB and democracy at the individual level. The 
two contrasting images of the MB held by Saudi Arabia and Qatar was a significant 
contributing factoring in causing the 2017 crisis. The inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in 








 On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt 
announced that they were severing diplomatic ties with Qatar.1 The former three additionally 
closed their air space to Qatari aircraft, banned their citizens from visiting Qatar, and gave 
Qatari citizens living in their territory fourteen days to leave.2 Saudi Arabia even closed its 
land border with Qatar, Qatar’s only connection to the mainland. As of writing this paper, 
this crisis is ongoing with little signs of ending. 
 The four aggrieved countries made a list of thirteen demands for Qatar that included 
closing its diplomatic mission to Iran, ending ties to terrorist organizations as designated by 
the four countries, shutting down the state-run news outlet Al Jazeera, and realigning 
economically, politically, and militarily with the other Arab countries.3 Given these demands, 
the 2017 Gulf Crisis (as this event will be called hereafter) is clearly the result of a number of 
unresolved disputes between Qatar and its neighbors. Each area of dispute, such as relations 
with Iran or economic coordination, could potentially be the subject of a major study. This 
paper, however, will focus on the role of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in leading up to the 
crisis. 
At first, the Muslim Brotherhood may seem unrelated to the list of demands given to 
Qatar, but Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt designated the Islamist organization 
                                                 
1 Timothy Lenderking, Perry Cammack, Ali Shihabi, and Des Roches, “The GCC Rift: Regional and Global 
Implications,” Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017): 6. 
2 Faisal Mukhyat Abu Sulaib, “Understanding Qatar’s Foreign Policy, 1995-2017,” Middle East Policy 26, no. 4 
(2017): 32. 
3 Abu Sulaib, “Understanding Qatar’s Foreign Policy,” 33. 
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as a terrorist group in 2014.4 Additionally, Al Jazeera hosts pro-Muslim Brotherhood 
figures.5 This paper demonstrates the importance of including the MB in the study of the 
2017 Gulf Crisis with a direct comparison of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In many ways, the two 
countries are similar. Both countries are non-democratic and predominantly Sunni-Arab 
states. However, in regards to the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are directly 
opposed to each other. The Saudi regime views the Muslim Brotherhood’s push for 
democratic reform as a direct threat to their autocracy. The Saudis also rely heavily on 
religious legitimacy to maintain their power that the MB’s own Islamic ideology challenges 
in multiple ways. The Qataris maintain strong ties with the MB as part of a long-term foreign 
policy strategy to remain independent of Saudi Arabia (or any other state) and become an 
important international actor. Al Jazeera also plays a role in Qatar’s foreign policy goals in 
becoming an international actor by promoting a positive image of the state throughout the 
Middle East. In contrast to Saudi Arabia, the MB does not push for democratic reform in 
Qatar nor does it challenge the legitimacy of the Qatari ruling family.  
Following the Arab Spring, a lot of literature has been written on sectarianism in the 
Persian Gulf.6 While interest in this subject is appropriate, not a lot of literature has discussed 
other areas of relevance, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. When the MB is included in the 
conversation, the issues of democracy, domestic legitimacy, and internal security are brought 
forward. Additionally, this study on the MB may help increase understanding of other 
conflicts in the Middle East. 
                                                 
4 Matthew Hedges and Giorgio Cafiero, “The GCC and the Muslim Brotherhood: What does the Future Hold?,” 
Middle East Policy 24, no. 1 (2017): 134. 
5 Sudarsan Raghavan and Joby Warrick, “How a 91-year-old imam came to symbolize the feud between Qatar 
and its neighbors,” The Washington Post, June 27, 2017.  
6 See Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring that Wasn’t, (Stanford 
University Press, 2013) and Frederic Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab 
Uprisings, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 
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 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Included in the introduction is a 
brief section that defines important key terms that are important to this discussion, such as 
the region that is the Middle East as well as sectarianism. Chapter 2 provides a history of the 
Muslim Brotherhood from its inception in the 1920s up to the latter years of the reign of 
President Hosni Mubarak. This chapter is primarily set in Egypt, where Hasan al-Bana 
founded the organization and gives important insight into how the MB has changed and 
expanded over time.  
 Chapters 3 and 4 are the case studies on the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar respectively. These two chapters set the stage for the 2017 Gulf Crisis and explain the 
divergent views the Saudis and Qataris hold towards the Muslim Brotherhood. Chapter 5 
outlines this paper’s main theories towards understanding the view of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and democracy at the individual level. This chapter uses data from the Arab 
Barometer IV survey to test those theories. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the paper by 
summarizing the main arguments and offers areas in which this research could be expanded. 
 
Key Terms 
Before continuing, it is vital to define key terms that will be used throughout this 
paper. First, the Middle East can be a difficult region to define because of its unique position 
at the crossroads of three continents and its complex history. Roderic Davison addressed the 
confusing history of this region in his article “Where is the Middle East?”7 Davison showed 
how the terms “Near East” and “Middle East” have changed over time. The most restrictive 
definitions limit the Middle East to the Arab-speaking world, but this excludes Turkey and 
Iran. Definitions that are more expansive include territories controlled by the former Ottoman 
                                                 
7 Roderic H. Davison, “Where is the Middle East?” Foreign Affairs 38, no. 4 (1960): 665-675. 
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Empire at the height of its power, including the Balkans. An argument can even be made to 
include a majority of the Islamic world from Morocco in the west to Pakistan and Central 
Asia to the east.  
Davison did not provide a strict definition of the Middle East but did offer three 
possibilities to address the problem.8 First is to view the Middle East as shapeless, more a 
state of mind than a specific 
territory. Second is to admit 
that there is no specific Middle 
East, but many different 
definitions depending on the 
situation. As such, scholars 
need to redefine the region 
anew with every study. Finally, 
is to agree to an arbitrary 
definition based potentially on 
the commonalities of the 
previous definitions. 
Using the third solution, the one favored by Davison, the core countries of the Middle 
East include Turkey, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Yemen, and Oman. For the purpose of this paper, 
this collection of countries will be used to define the Middle East. 
In addition to this strict definition of the Middle East, this paper will add two other 
sub-regions. First, North Africa is an important region for this study, which includes 
                                                 
8 Davison, “Where is the Middle East?” 674. 
Figure 1: Map of the Middle East 
5 
 
Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt.  Both the Middle East and North Africa 
together will be referred to as the MENA. Second, a significant subsection of these countries 
is those with an Arab heritage or the Arab World. These include the countries of North 
Africa, the Levant (excluding Israel and Cyprus), the Arabian Peninsula, and Iraq. 
 Sectarianism can also be difficult to define. There can be some confusion for what 
this term means as it is used in a variety of different context. In this paper, sectarianism is 
defined as the creation of divisions in society based on religious differences for a specific 
interest.9 For example, extremist Islamist terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS), targeted various religious groups, primarily Shiites, in order to consolidate a 
following of Sunni extremists. Much more subtle, some political leaders of Middle Eastern 
countries have used sectarian messages to prevent a unified protest movement from forming. 
Both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain used this technique during the Arab Spring to label protestors 
as Shi’a radicals, dissuading many Sunnis from joining the movement.10 
 Jihad is another complex term that is often misunderstood. Jihad literally translates to 
“to strive” but can have a variety of meanings in Islam. The term can mean a personal 
internal struggle with evil and sin (“greater jihad”) or can be associated with war against 
oppressors (“lesser jihad).11 Some interpretations of jihad have associated the term with wars 
against unbelievers while others use the term strictly to refer to defensive struggles. This 
paper will primarily be using the latter definition, war in the defense of Islam, but this use of 
the term is by no means definitive in the study of Islam. 
                                                 
9 Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf, ix. 
10 Mohammad Yaghi, “Media and Sectarianism in the Middle East: Saudi Hegemony over Pan-Arab Media,” 
International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics 12, no. 1&2 (2017): 48. 
11 Assaf Moghadam, “Mayhem, Myths, and Martyrdom: the Shi’a Conception of Jihad,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 19 (2007): 126.  
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 Finally, Salafism (derived from the Arabic world salaf meaning ancestors) is a term 
that has shifted in meaning over the past century. Henri Lauzière discussed this shift at 
length. Currently, purist Salafism is the more widespread understanding of the term. To 
purists, Salafism is “Islam as it was first revealed, unsullied by any innovation, deviation, or 
accretion and uncontaminated by exogenous influence.”12 Although Lauzière cautions that no 
definition of Salafism is absolute, this paper will use this purist understanding of the term in 
the following discussion.  
                                                 
12 Henri Lauzière, The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century, (New York: Columbia 




HISTORY & EVOLUTION OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 
 
Early History 
 This overview of the Muslim Brotherhood will begin at their founding. While much 
of the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood can be seen as irrelevant to the modern 
discussion of the organization, this section is vital for showing the values and ideology on 
which the Muslim Brotherhood was founded. 
The Society of Muslim Brothers (later renamed the Muslim Brotherhood) was 
founded in 1928 in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna.13 Al-Banna and his followers were upset with 
the growing secularism in Egyptian society following the revolution of 1919. The 
Brotherhood feared the removal of Islam from everyday Egyptian life. The organization 
gathered a following by opposing the ongoing British presence in Egypt and the trend of 
Egyptian universities towards adopting a Western style of education. In his teachings, Al-
Banna argued that Egypt should not follow the Western model of politics, economics, and 
education. Instead, he thought that Egypt should return to Islam and sharia law so that 
Western foreigners could not control Egyptian society.14 In essence, al-Banna founded the 
MB to resist foreign domination by creating a moral revitalization of Egypt.15 
Al-Banna advocated for gradual change by winning the hearts and minds of the 
Egyptian people. The MB displayed its commitment to the Egyptian lower class by offering 
charitable services and building mosques and schools. The MB, unsurprisingly, filled these 
                                                 
13 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement, (Princeton 
University Press, 2013), 20. 
14 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 22. 
15 Martin Kramer, Arab Awakening & Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideas in the Middle East, (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 144. 
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mosques and schools with sympathetic preachers and teachers sympathetic to the MB’s own 
tenets. These institutions also competed with the Christian schools and charitable services, 
which the Brotherhood viewed as instruments of foreign influence.  
Hasan al-Banna did not form the Society of Muslim Brothers as a political party, but 
slowly the organization became involved with Egyptian elections. At its founding, al-Banna 
insisted that the MB should not seek to gather power but focus solely on social reform. If the 
MB could successfully transform society, then the Egyptian people would demand Islamic 
reform regardless of who was in power. However, the MB’s stance changed in 1941 when 
the organization decided to participate in the next year’s parliamentary elections. 
Although al-Banna did call for the gradual change, as mentioned above, al-Banna and 
the Muslim Brotherhood embraced the concept of jihad as a legitimate use of force to defend 
the Muslim community. Specifically, they advocated for the right to defend against imperial 
powers and Zionists. In fact, the MB developed a paramilitary force in the 1930s that even 
fought with rival political factions within Egypt. The military wing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood became so prominent that it created a separate unit, known as the “secret 
apparatus.” This activity led to the dissolution of the MB in 1948 by the Egyptian 
government, but violence continued which lead to the assassination of Prime Minister 
Nuqrashi Pasaha and the death of al-Banna in 1949 at the hands of government agents.16 
In 1952, the Free Officers’ coup overthrew the constitutional monarchy of Egypt. The 
new government originally welcomed the Muslim Brotherhood but by 1954, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser consolidated his power and began to view the organization as a threat because of its 
large following and growing military capabilities, via the secret apparatus. The government 
once dissolved the MB in 1954. In retaliation, a member of the secret apparatus attempted to 
                                                 
16 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 26. 
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assassinate Nasser in the same year, which led to a brutal government crackdown of the 
Muslim Brotherhood that lasted from 1954 to 1970.17 As a result, government agents drove 
many members of the MB underground or into exile. Many members traveled to sympathetic 
Arab countries and Europe. These exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood would play a 
significant role in the educational and judicial development of the Arab world, especially in 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as will be discussed in later chapters. 
Nasser arrested many members of the Muslim Brotherhood while in power. Among 
those imprisoned was the ideologue Sayyid Qutb. While in prison, Qutb promoted a more 
radical ideology than the gradualist approach followed by the majority of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.18 He denounced the Nasser regime as un-Islamic and called for its immediate 
and violent overthrow. The government executed Qutb in 1966, but only after he had 
gathered a significant following who viewed him as a martyr.19  
The distinction between the teachings of Sayyid Qutb and that of the other senior 
leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood at the time is important to note in the evolution of the 
MB. Qutb wrote extensively on the practice of takfir or the act of declaring another Muslim 
an apostate.20 He used takfir as justification for declaring jihad against the Nasser regime 
because, according to Qutb, the Nasserists were not Muslim and were persecuting legitimate 
Muslims. Hassan al-Hudaybi, the successor of al-Banna, spoke out against Qutb’s ideology. 
He wrote that people could not judge for themselves whether a professed Muslim was an 
apostate and that only God alone could pass this judgement.21 Al-Hudaybi’s teachings further 
                                                 
17 Barbara Zoller, “Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal Struggle during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
Persecution, 1954 to 1971,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 39, no. 3 (2007): 411-433. 
18 Zoller, “Prison Talk,” 416. 
19 Zoller, “Prison Talk,” 419. 
20 Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs 86 (2007): 110. 
21 Leiken and Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” 110. 
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reinforce the gradualist teachings of his predecessor, emphasizing nonviolent and non-
revolutionary opposition.22 Qutb believed that man-made laws and states were not 
compatible with Islamic (God-made) laws. The supporters of Al-Hudaybi argued that 
Muslims could still abide by Islamic law even without an Islamic state, meaning that change 
did not have to be immediate. Ultimately, this disagreement led to many followers of Qutb 
splitting from the MB and forming radical revolutionary movements (such as al-Jihad a 
predecessor of the Egyptian al Qaeda). 
When Gamal Abdel Nasser died in 1970, Anwar Sadat succeeded him. Sadat pushed 
back against Nasser’s radical social and economic policies, including the criminalization of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1971, Sadat granted members of the MB amnesty and released 
many members from prison. He even invited exiled MB members back to Egypt. Sadat and 
the MB maintained a tolerate relationship of each other throughout most of the 1970s, but 
tensions began to sour over the Camp David Accords signed by Egypt and Israel in 1978. 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood from 1979 to 2012 
Three key events shook the Middle East in 1979. The first was the end of the Iranian 
Revolution that gave rise to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The second was the peace treaty 
signed between Egypt in Israel, resulting from the Camp David Accords from the year prior. 
Finally, the siege of the Grand Mosque of Mecca greatly altered Saudi Arabia’s stance on 
Islamism in the kingdom. The latter will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, but 
the first two deal directly with the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
Naturally, the Iranian revolution led to a general uneasiness among the other regimes 
of the Middle East, who feared a similar revolution forming in their own country. In 
                                                 
22 Zoller, “Prison Talk,” 423. 
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particular, the threat appeared to be from Islamist movements, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood. As stated before, the ultimate goal of the MB was to create a complete Islamic 
society, similar to that of Iran. To the autocratic rulers of the Middle East, such as Sadat, it 
was very possible that the Muslim Brotherhood could be inspired the Iranian revolution, 
especially after the MB initially declared its support for the revolution.23 
The 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel would end up being the breaking 
point between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Sadat regime. As mentioned previously, the 
MB was furiously opposed to encroaching Western influence in the Middle East and the 
organization viewed Sadat’s peace with Israel as comprising Egypt. In the same year, the 
Muslim Brotherhood began openly criticizing the regime. By 1981, Sadat began a crackdown 
and imprisonment of many political leaders and other Brotherhood leaders. Later that year 
the militant Islamist group al-Jihad assassinated Sadat.24 
Hosni Mubarak became the new president of Egypt following Sadat’s death in 1981. 
During the first years of his reign, Mubarak avoided controversy with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its radical offshoots to avoid the fate of his predecessor. The MB, in turn, 
took advantage of the favorable political climate to form alliances first with the nationalist 
secular Wafd party in 1984 and then with the Socialist Labor Party and Liberal Party in 
1987.25 Mubarak still opposed the idea of the MB forming its own political party, hence the 
need for the MB to form coalitions. The established political parties offered the MB an 
opportunity to gain seats in parliament while the MB provided a popular base of voters. 
                                                 
23 Walid M. Abdelnasser, “Islamic Organizations in Egypt and the Iranian Revolution of 1979: The Experience 
of the First Few Years,” Arab Studies Quarterly 19, no. 2 (1997): 28.  
24 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 33. 
25 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 47. 
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Senior leaders justified the Muslim Brotherhood’s entrance into politics in a number 
of ways. First, they claimed that the MB was not seeking power but to spread their message. 
Second, they pointed out that Hasan al-Banna himself had run for office in the 1940s. 
Finally, they believed that the MB could better hold the government accountable for 
providing to the poor and working towards Shari’a law with a presence in the parliament.26 
Overall, the 1980s were a crucial time for the Muslim Brotherhood’s development as a 
political party. 
Mubarak, much like his predecessors, began to fear the growing influence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The MB had cultivated a large regional network with its connections to 
the Afghan mujahedeen, who were fighting Soviet occupation in the 1980s.27 Within Egypt, 
the MB became the main opposition in the 1987 Parliament. Mubarak had the courts 
dissolved the 1987 Parliament in an attempt to limit the MB. This action led to the boycott of 
the 1990 elections by the MB and the Wafd Party.28 In 1992, the MB won major election 
victories in the medical and bar associations. In response, Mubarak dissolved the bar 
association and had the parliament pass a law limiting the MB’s influence in all profession 
unions.29  
The Muslim Brotherhood began openly calling for constitutional reform, but these 
protests only lead to a further government crackdown. In 1995, government agents detained 
eighty-two members of the MB’s Shura Council on charges of plotting to overthrow the 
government. An attempted assassination on Mubarak in Ethiopia the same year raised 
                                                 
26 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 49. 
27 Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 39. 
28 Mona El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 37 (2005): 381. 
29 El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” 382. 
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tensions between the MB and government, even though the MB denounced the action. A 
military tribunal sentenced fifty-four election-seeking members of the MB to prison. The 
subsequent elections of 1995 were the most violent in Egyptian history with only one seat 
secured for the MB.30  
The Muslim Brotherhood continued to advocate for democratic reform but refrained 
from delegitimizing the government and Mubarak. Governmental crackdowns continued into 
the early 2000s, especially during times of election. There was a brief respite in hostilities 
when in 2003, the government and MB coordinated antiwar rallies protesting the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq but later the same year security forces detained some of the MB leaders 
responsible for the rallies.31 These setbacks did not prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from 
putting on a strong showing in the 2005 Parliamentary elections, where they won eighty-
eight seats.32 This success, however, led to a new wave of repression that lasted up to the 
Arab Spring. 
From 2005-2011, Mubarak feared that the growing power of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in conjunction with Hamas’s takeover of the West Bank in 2006, and increased sectarian 
violence Iraq as a sign of the growing influence of Islamist groups in the region. This was 
also a general concern of the Bush administration and as a result, lessened pressure on the 
Mubarak regime towards democratic reform.33 Mubarak’s government branded the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a radical and revolutionary movement, citing the December 2006 Al-Azhar 
University protests, where around fifty members of the MB dressed in black military 
                                                 
30 El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” 384. 
31 El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” 389. 
32 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 118. 
33 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 121. 
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fatigues.34 The old guard of the MB argued that these accusations were overblown and 
continued to advocate for non-violence. For the most part, the response from the leadership 
of the MB was non-confrontational, fearing even further repression from the regime. In fact, 
this non-confrontation policy remained in place until the 2011 Egyptian revolution was in 
full swing, as the MB did not play a role in initiating the popular movement.35 
After the fall of Mubarak, Egypt held new elections in 2012. The Muslim 
Brotherhood received a considerable number of seats in parliament but also secured the 
presidency with Mohamed Morsi. What happens next for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
will be covered throughout the next two chapters as it involves discussion on both Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar. For a moment in 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood had finally secured an 
opportunity to shape Egyptian society.  
The history of the Muslim Brotherhood shows why a mixed view of the Islamist party 
exists today. On one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood has similar goals to those of the 1979 
Iranian revolutionaries but with its own brand of Islamism. Additionally states that oppose 
the MB can point to the few violent episodes in its history and potential connections to 
terrorist groups (such as Hamas in Palestine and al-Qaeda with the Afghan mujahedeen) to 
hurt the image of the MB. However, the Muslim Brotherhood has also worked towards 
democratic reform in a gradual non-confrontational manner within Egypt. The MB did not 
violently take over Egypt in 2012, the Egyptian people elected the MB. The proper view of 
the MB is likely to acknowledge that both of these narratives have truth in them, but it is easy 
to see how a particular state could pick a narrative that suits their own interests.  
                                                 
34 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 121. 
35 Eric Trager, Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days, (Washington D.C.: 




CASE STUDY: SAUDI ARABIA 
 
Now that the organizational history of the Muslim Brotherhood has been established, 
this paper now turns to two case studies on Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Recall the purpose of 
this work is to determine how these two countries have recently come to disagree on the 
nature of the Muslim Brotherhood. Each case study first offers the historical context of the 
MB within Saudi Arabia and Qatar before exploring the current relations that explain how 
the origins of the 2017 Gulf Crisis. Chapter 3 seeks to explain the current tense relations 
between Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
Historical Relations 
 Relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia started out warm when 
Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the organization, visited the desert kingdom during the Hajj 
in 1932. The first Saudi king, Abdulaziz, offered the devout Muslim Brotherhood financial 
assistance and in return, the MB aided the formation of the Saudi judiciary system and 
supported Abdulaziz’s tenuous claim over the Hijaz (and thus the holy city of Mecca).36  
 The rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954 strengthened the friendship between the 
Saudis and the Muslim Brotherhood. As mentioned previously, Nasser expelled many 
members of the MB from Egypt during the 1950s. These expatriates found refuge in Saudi 
Arabia, as the Saudis viewed Nasser as a geopolitical threat. The Saudis ruled as an absolute 
religious monarchy in their country that contrasted sharply with the secular and nationalistic 
rule of Nasser in Egypt. Both countries vied to be the leading voice of the Arab World and 
                                                 
36 Lauzière, The Making of Salafism, 76. 
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had contrasting views on the future of the World. Nasser had a vision of a single united Arab 
country while the Saudis preferred a loose league of Arab states with each country retaining 
its own autonomy. The literature refers to this time of tension between the secular republics 
and the Islamist monarchies of the Middle East as the Arab Cold War, which lasted from 
1954-1967.37 During this era, the Saudis and Muslim Brotherhood shared a common cause in 
opposing Nasser. In the meantime, the Saudis welcomed the highly educated exiled members 
of the MB into their developing education system. With the death of Nasser, relations 
between Saudi Arabia and Egypt slowly improved during the 1970s 
 Important to the discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia is the 
distinction between the MB’s own brand of Islamism and Wahhabism. Since its conquest of 
the Arabian Peninsula early in the twentieth century, the Saudi monarchy has allied with the 
Wahhabi branch of Islam.  Wahhabism, stemming from Sunni Islam, comes from the 
teachings of Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the late 1700s.38 The core tenets of 
Wahhabism emphasize the oneness of God and the avoidance of all things that may lead to 
polytheism, such as idols, amulets, and talismans. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab even called for the 
destruction of places where idols worship occurs.39 Wahhabism is also considered a Salafi 
ideology, as defined in the introduction. During the 1970s, purist Salafism became firmly 
associated with Wahhabism in the minds of many Muslims.40 
 It was also during the 1970s that Salafists distinguished themselves from the Islamism 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, who they felt focused too much on politics. Salafists also 
                                                 
37 Morten Valbjørn and André Bank, “The New Arab Cold War: Rediscovering the Arab Dimension of the 
Middle East Regional Politics,” Review of International Studies 38 (2012): 10. 
38 Jeffrey R. Macris, “Investigating the ties between Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, early Wahhabism, and 
ISIS,” The Journal of the Middle East 7, no. 3 (2016): 245. 
39 Macris, “Investigating the ties between Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, early Wahhabism, and ISIS,” 245. 
40 Lauzière, The Making of Salafism, 200. 
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became less concerned with the spread of secularism and Western cultural invasion, at least 
compared to the Muslim Brotherhood.41 Overall, while Wahhabism and Salafism generally 
focus on a conservative return to Islam as the Prophet Muhammad originally founded it, the 
Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood focuses on incorporating Islam with modern society 
through gradual reform. Although not exactly aligned, the two ideologies were not in direct 
conflict with each other. In fact, a movement known as the Sahwa (Awakened) rose within 
Saudi Arabia that blended the two ideologies.42 
 As mentioned in the previous section, the 1970s ended with a series of far-reaching 
events. The 1979 siege of the Grand Mosque of Mecca would be one of the most impactful 
on Saudi Arabia’s stance towards Islam’s place within the country. Radical Sunni militants 
lead by Juhayman al-Otaybi seized the Grand Mosque late in 1979. The ideology of these 
militants will not be discussed here, but the impact of this event on Saudi Arabia was 
significant. Because of this attack, the Saudi regime decided to slow down the liberalization 
of the country.43 Part of this strategy involved a greater alliance between the regime and 
Wahhabi clerics. The Saudis hoped that by promoting Wahhabi teachings, the radical 
conservatives in Saudi Arabia, such as Juhayman, would be satisfied. The aim for the Saudis 
was to prevent any future attacks like the seizing of the Grand Mosque. This closer alliance 
between the regime and the Wahhabi establishment continues to this day, with the Saudis 
relying on the religious ideology to retain legitimacy. The Sahwa and Muslim Brotherhood 
remained in good standing with the regime over the next decade following the Grand Mosque 
                                                 
41 Lauzière, The Making of Salafism, 218. 
42 Stéphane Lacroix, “Saudi Arabia’s Muslim Brotherhood Predicament,” The Washington Post, March 20, 
2014.  
43 Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia, 24. 
18 
 
incident, but the divergence between the reform-minded MB and the conservative Wahhabi 
only grew over time, as will be discussed in the next section. 
 The good relations between Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood did not last 
long into the 1990s. The Saudi family and the Sahwa came to blows over the invasion of 
Kuwait by Saddam Hussein of Iraq in 1990. The Saudis decided to invite the United States to 
lead a counter-invasion, but the MB and the Sahwa opposed allowing any foreign armies into 
the region.44 Recall that Hasan al-Banna founded the MB partly on the principle of anti-
colonialism, having feared a Western takeover in Egypt. The Sahwa also feared the intention 
of the United States and allies following the liberation of Kuwait. The Saudis, however, went 
ahead and invited the U.S. and allies to remove Hussein from Kuwait, which sparked protests 
from the Sahwa demanding political reform. Throughout the 1990s, the Saudis expelled MB 
leaders while limiting their and the Sahwa’s activities as both movements continued to 
openly criticize the Saudi regime.45 It is also important to note that Osama bin Laden had 
similar criticisms of the Saudis.46 Although the reaction of bin Laden would obviously be 
more extreme, this connection between the MB and al Qaeda would raise fears later on the 
potential extremism of MB Islamism.  
Relations somewhat thawed between the Saudis and the Muslim Brotherhood during 
the early 2000s as an agreement was struck between the regime and the Sahwa. The Saudis 
sought to secure a degree of religious legitimacy from the Sahwa as they campaigned against 
the ideology of al-Qaeda and other radical jihadist groups.47 The Sahwa agreed to refrain 
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from criticizing the Saudis and in return, the regime allowed them to resume their activities.48 
The Arab Spring of 2011, however, quickly ended the renewed relationship between the MB 
and the Saudis.   
 
Current Relations 
Why did the Saudi family turn hostile on the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab 
Spring? The regime and MB appear to share a conservative view on the place of Islam in 
modern Middle Eastern society. Both are proponents for Sharia law and education focused on 
Islam. Members of the MB and Sahwa have long served in both the judiciary and educational 
bureaucracy of Saudi Arabia, so the convergence of interests in these areas is not surprising. 
Yet, the alliance between the Saudi royal family and the Muslim Brotherhood has been 
shattered in the Arab Spring era.  
 Some of Saudi Arabia’s longtime allies fell during the Arab Spring, leading to an 
external security crisis for the Saudis. The Saudis had formed strong ties with Egypt during 
the reign of Hosni Mubarak. The days of the Arab Cold War had ended with the death of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970, leaving the door open for cooperation between Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt. Mubarak became a valuable ally to the Saudi royal family as the two Arab Sunni 
powers pushed against the threat of Shi’a Iran following the 1979 revolution.49 However, the 
Egyptian people overthrew Mubarak in 2011 and replaced him with democratically elected 
President Mohammed Morsi from the Muslim Brotherhood. The Saudis had also noted the 
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MB’s political gains in Libya and Tunisia following the overthrow of each country’s long-
time dictator Muammar Gaddafi and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, respectively.50 
 When President Morsi came to power in June of 2012, the Saudis ended all aid to 
Egypt.51 Immediately, Riyadh and their Gulf allies (not including Qatar) threw their support 
behind the Egyptian military and General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. In July 2013, al-Sisi 
successfully led a military coup that ousted Morsi. Saudi Arabia and its allies immediately 
resumed aid to Egypt. The Saudis justified that their backing of now President al-Sisi was 
necessary to stabilize Egypt and to counter growing Iranian influence in Syria and Iraq.52  
 The tacit alliance the Saudi regime had formed with the Sahwa at home was all but 
broken with the ousting of Morsi. Sahwa clerics criticized the Saudis in their preachings and 
on social media. This domestic backlash led to the arrest of a few Sahwa clerics but did not 
stop Saudi Arabia’s anti-Muslim Brotherhood campaign. The Saudis backed anti-Islamist 
forces in Libya’s multi-sided civil war with the goal of removing the MB from politics in the 
country. With Tunisia, the Saudis and the UAE targeted the Ennahda party (the local MB-
affiliate) by supporting their secular political rival the Nidda Tunis party. Saudi Arabia also 
gave asylum to Ben Ali, Tunisia’s deposed dictator.53   
 Riyadh went so far as to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization 
in March 2014.54 The most recent flare of tensions came with the 2017 Gulf Crisis where the 
Saudis and its allies demanded that Qatar, a longtime supporter of the MB, cut its ties to the 
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organization. Overall, it appears that the recent hostile actions of Saudi Arabia towards the 
MB are the result of the MB’s political success during the Arab Spring. 
 While the Muslim Brotherhood may pose somewhat of an external threat to the Saudi 
regime, the real threat is the potential for internal mobilization among Saudi citizens. This 
internal threat is two-pronged. First, the Muslim Brotherhood’s own brand of Islam poses a 
challenge to the royal family’s religious legitimacy. The Islamism of the Muslim 
Brotherhood has significantly diverged from Wahhabi ideology. Wahhabism has remained a 
conservative movement, reinforced with forty years of support from the Saudi regime (since 
the 1979 Siege of the Gran Mosque) that is dedicated to a literal interpretation of the Koran.55 
The purpose of this strict interpretation of Islam is to return Islam to the state that it was 
founded and bring about the unity of the Muslim community.56 The Muslim Brotherhood, on 
the other hand, has a more accommodating approach in interpreting scripture grounded in the 
modern world. The divergence became clear in the 1990s when a new generation of Brothers 
revised the Brotherhood’s ideology, in order to be more appealing as candidates in Egyptian 
elections.57 For example, the MB reinterpreted parts of the Koran to argue that men do not 
have complete tutelage over women, especially in public affairs. This interpretation allowed 
for increased participation of women in elections, both running for office and voting. By the 
early 2000s, the new generation had reached the upper offices of the MB, allowing them to 
promote their accepting stances towards democracy, women’s rights, and non-Muslim 
(primarily Coptic) rights.58 The Muslim Brotherhood has continued to adapt in order to 
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remain relevant in elections. Wahhabism has not needed to compete within Saudi Arabia for 
followers and so has not greatly revised its ideology. For example, men in Saudi Arabia still 
control how the women in their family dress and where they can travel.59 Additionally, it was 
not until 2011 that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia granted women the right to vote, which 
Wahhabi scholars still opposed.60 With information becoming more accessible through the 
internet and Al Jazeera the Saudi regime fears the potential of the MB spreading its brand of 
Islam in Saudi Arabia and competing with Wahhabism. 
The second internal threat that the Muslim Brotherhood poses to the Saudi regime is a 
direct political to the monarchy. One aspect of this threat would be a direct overthrow of the 
regime. In this case, the Saudis could view the MB’s wide success following the revolutions 
of the Arab Spring with suspicion. The UAE specifically was alarmed by the MB’s electoral 
success and concerned by how quickly the MB seized power in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia 
following the overthrow of each country’s dictator. 61 These electoral victories are perhaps a 
sign that the Muslim Brotherhood was not simply a passive group but instead waited for an 
opportunity such as the Arab Spring to take power. 
The growing ambition of the Muslim Brotherhood over time could also be seen as a 
concerning side for the Saudi regime. At its founding, Hasan al-Banna vowed that the 
Muslim Brotherhood would not seek power but to instead remain a social movement. The 
MB changed over time to become a savvy and pragmatic political institution by the twenty-
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first century.62 This ambition culminated with the MB fielding Mohammed Morsi as a 
candidate for the Egyptian presidency.  
In Saudi Arabia, the Sahwa could perhaps follow the path as their Brothers in 
neighboring Egypt. The same could happen if mass protests were to break out in Saudi 
Arabia. Unlike the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, who had hesitated to join the 
revolutionary movement, the Sahwa of Saudi Arabia could very well initiate these protests. 
The Sahwa has a history of activism beginning in the 1990s that resurged after the ousting of 
Morsi in 2013.  
Overall, the Saudis view the Muslim Brotherhood as a direct threat to the stability of 
their country because of their involvement in the revolutions of the Arab Spring, challenge to 
Wahhabism, and commitment to democratic reform. This view has led the Saudi regime to 
become hostile towards the Muslim Brotherhood an in part initiate the 2017 Gulf Crisis. 
Importantly, this hostility is not the result of sectarian goals for the Saudi regime, but rather a 
concern (primarily) for domestic legitimacy.  
                                                 




CASE STUDY: QATAR 
 
Historical Relations 
 The history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar begins in the 1950s, similar to Saudi 
Arabia. MB members fled to Qatar following their exile from Egypt under the Nasser 
regime.63 At the time, Qatar was an emerging state with only a population of around twenty-
five thousand with little governmental structure.64 Oil and natural gas gradually replaced the 
traditional industries of the country, pearling and fishing, which increased the profits of the 
Qatari ruling family, the Al Thani. The combination of this newfound wealth and the influx 
of educated members of the Muslim Brotherhood allowed the Qatar regime to develop a 
school system. Like in Saudi Arabia, MB members rose quickly in the ranks of the 
educational bureaucracy.   
Although the Muslim Brotherhood was popular amongst foreign expatriates within 
the country, the native Qataris remained outside the Brotherhood’s influence for four reasons. 
First, Wahhabism remained the most popular religious ideology among both the Qatari rulers 
and the native population, much like Saudi Arabia. The ruling family originated from the 
same region in Saudi Arabia as Muhammad Al Wahhab and maintained close ties to the 
sect.65 Second, although the MB remains influential within the education system, the Qatari 
regime screens all religious textbooks to ensure they are in line with the state. The regime 
also restricts Brotherhood religious scholars from exerting domestic influence by limiting 
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their religious institutions.66 Third, the MB was unable to build up support by offering 
welfare, such as running hospitals. Although Qatar was a relatively poor state in the 1950s, 
by the 1970s, the Qatari regime began to exercise its rentier state status by providing jobs, 
housing, generous wages, and healthcare to its citizens.67 The Muslim Brotherhood simply 
could not compete with the Qatari government. Finally, Qatar has only one elected advisory 
institution, the Central Municipal Council, while also having a ban on political parties.68 As a 
result, the MB was unable to become politically influential. The same could be said about the 
MB in Saudi Arabia, except with the emergence of the Sahwa. 
 The Qatari branch of the Muslim Brotherhood had to adapt within the country. Major 
debates occurred within the Qatari branch of the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1980s about 
how to remain relevant despite the lack of elections and the need for social services in Qatar. 
This inwards reflection ultimately led to the self-disbandment of the Qatari Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1999 as the members no longer felt the need for a formal organization. 
Although disbanded, Qatari Brotherhood members never left. Without official publications or 
formal meetings, the few remaining followers focus on intellectual and spiritual pursuits but 
do continue to follow the Brotherhood’s core tenants.69 
Despite all of these obstacles, the Muslim Brotherhood (as an international 
organization) has remained a mainstay in Qatar from the 1950s to the present day. The Qatari 
regime and the MB created a mutually beneficial relationship. The MB provides Qatar with 
education expertise and an internationally connected network while Qatar gives the MB a 
safe haven as a base of operation. Little conflict emerged between the Qatar regime and the 
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MB as the MB remained primarily outward facing for the reasons explained in the previous 
paragraph.  
This alliance, however, led to several confrontations between Qatar and other Middle 
Eastern countries throughout the 1990s. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE became 
concerned about the Muslim Brotherhood’s push for political reform.70 Recall that the Sahwa 
had lead protests against the Saudi monarchy following the regime’s invitation of U.S. troops 
to liberate Kuwait, leading to Saudi repression of the Sahwa and the MB. Egypt, in 
particular, felt threatened by Qatar’s direct support for the pro-Muslim Brotherhood regime 
in neighboring Sudan.71 Qatar maintained its strong ties to the MB despite these protests 
from its neighbors.  
The year 1995 saw a major shift in Qatari foreign policy that greatly increased the 
importance of the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar’s foreign policy strategy. In 1995, 
Sheikh Hamad al-Thani seized power in Qatar from his father. Sheik Hamad immediately set 
out to increase the independence of Qatar from its neighbors, primarily Saudi Arabia.72 Qatar 
had long suffered from having little status at the international level. Fellow Muslim countries 
did not even give Qatar representatives at World Muslim Congresses until after 1962.73 Sheik 
Hamad’s goal was to overcome Qatar’s small size and small population to make Qatar not 
only a regional player but also a global actor.  
Hosting the Muslim Brotherhood allowed Qatar to differentiate itself from its 
neighbors. Qatar became critical in negotiations between its agitated neighbors and the MB. 
The launching of Al Jazeera in 1996 furthered the goals of Qatar. The news network allowed 
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Qatar to promote the Qatari state across the region by giving itself an international platform. 
Additionally, Al Jazeera became a platform for the Muslim Brotherhood. The most 
influential MB preacher on Al Jazeera is Yusuf al-Qaradawi. His preachings reach millions 
of people listen to his sermons throughout the Middle East.74  
In fact, Yusuf al-Qaradawi is critical to understanding the wider conflict between 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia and warrants an extended discussion. Born in Egypt in 1926 he 
received a religious education before joining the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1940s and 
becoming an active member.75 Like many of his Brothers, Egyptian authorities imprisoned 
Qaradawi in the 1950s. During this time, Qaradawi emphasized patience in his writings, in 
line the gradualist nature of the MB.76 He traveled to Qatar in the 1960s where he developed 
a centralist ideology that seeks to balance the conservative and liberal aspects of Islamism. 
The biggest draw for many Muslims to Qaradawi is his acceptance of modernity, interpreting 
the Koran to deal with the modern world rather than interpreting the Koran literally. For 
example, a verse of the Koran praises the raising of horses for the purpose of jihad but 
Qaradawi expands on this concept to include all military vehicles used today.77 This ideology 
has led Qaradawi to support some moderate views including his approval of the democratic 
participation of Muslims living in the West and the condemnation of al-Qaeda and the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).78 However, as a centrist he has also received criticism 
from reformists for his harsher views on women and homosexual rights as well as his support 
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for Hamas’ use of violence against Israel. With the creation of Al Jazeera, Qaradawi has 
been able to spread his message to a wide audience across the Middle East. 
Continuing with the story of Qatar, part of Sheikh Hamad’s strategy was also to 
restore relations with Iran, once again differentiating itself from the other Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states. Not surprising, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states grew even 
more irate at these policies, viewing Al Jazeera as a propaganda machine for Qatar and the 
MB and Qatar as treasonous for becoming friendly with Iran. Overall, Qatar was able to stay 
in good graces in the GCC through the 1990s and 2000s by carefully balancing its foreign 
policy, all the while remaining a staunch ally of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
Current Relations 
 The Arab Spring serves as a pivotal moment in the relationship between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Qatar. In contrast to Saudi Arabia, Qatar remained supportive of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar backed the Muslim Brotherhood’s affiliates in Libya and the 
Ennahda Party (MB associated) in Tunisia during the uprisings. Upon the election of 
President Morsi in Egypt, Qatar immediately pledged tens of billions of dollars in 
investments to the struggling Egyptian economy.79 Qatar also supported the Muslim 
Brotherhood branches in Syria and Yemen following the outbreak of civil war in both 
countries. In Syria, Qatar backed political candidates with links to the Muslim Brotherhood 
in 2013 as a government in exile while also sending around three billion dollars in arms aid 
to Syrian opposition groups.80  
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 With these investments, the Qatar regime was continuing its policy of overcoming its 
size and lesser status in the Middle East. Qatar historically relied on its much larger and 
influential neighbor Saudi Arabia for geopolitics in the region. The Arab Spring offered the 
Qatar regime an opportunity to distinguish itself from its neighbors by favoring the Muslim 
Brotherhood. In a way, this move was a gamble. If Qatar successfully backed pro-
Brotherhood regimes across the Middle East, the small country would have created many 
allies, increased its regional influence, and removed itself from the shadow of Saudi Arabia.  
 However, this gamble did not immediately pay off. Libya collapsed into civil war 
while the war in Syria continued and costs mounted. Secular parties also diminished the 
electoral victory of the Ennahda party in Tunisia.81  Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain 
were able to weather the initial wave of protestors in 2011 and set about countering Qatar’s 
growing influence. The three countries backed General el-Sisi’s coup in Egypt in 2013, 
worked to limit the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, and even briefly recalled 
their ambassadors from Qatar in the spring of 2014.82 
 In the midst of these challenges, Sheik Hamad al-Thani agreed to hand over power to 
his son Tamim al-Thani who became the Emir of Qatar in June of 2013.83 The Qataris did 
take some measures to appease its neighbors by expelling a few high members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, but overall the regime continued its support for the Islamist organization. Qatar 
once again faced troubles with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain on June 5, 2017.84 The 
three countries, along with Egypt, severed diplomatic ties to Qatar while also closing their 
airspace to Qatari aircraft. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain even demanded that Qatari 
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citizens leave their territory while banning their own citizens from traveling to Qatar. Saudi 
Arabia additionally closed its border with Qatar to all trade, shutting off about forty percent 
of Qatar’s food supply.85 
 The four aggrieved countries did cite Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other “terrorist” organizations but Al Jazeera’s “propaganda” and Qatar’s inappropriate 
relations with Iran also upset them.86 These four countries felt particularly threatened by 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who U.S. officials consider one of the most influential figures in the 
Middle East.87 The Muslim Brotherhood’s, and especially Qaradawi’s, teachings that Islam 
can be reinterpreted to work in the modern world is a direct threat to the Wahhabi notion that 
Islam needs to return to how it was founded in order to remain true. The Saudis fear that 
Qaradawi’s message will become widespread, through Al Jazeera, within Saudi Arabia 
leading many to question the tenets of Wahhabism, which the Saudi regime relies on to 
maintain power. For example, if democracy is compatible with Islam, as Qaradawi has 
stated, then Saudi citizens may question the need for the monarchy that exists in Saudi 
Arabia.88 Essentially, the Saudi regime fears that a less stringent interpretation of the Koran 
will have a wider appeal than the conservative interpretation of Wahhabism that requires a lot 
more effort for individual Muslims to fulfill their faith.  
It is possible that Qatar allows the preachings of Qaradawi to air on Al Jazeera 
because of the challenges his ideology poses to Qatar’s neighbors, but it may also be an 
unintentional consequence from Qatar’s general support of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
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allowing the organization to use Al Jazeera. Despite the pressure, Qatar has yet to give in to 
the demands of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt to sever ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Iran and close down Al Jazeera. In order to overcome the shortage of food, 
Qatar has increased trade with Turkey and Iran.89  
 Despite these recent developments, the Qatar regime has continued to back the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The MB is still critical for Qatar in its foreign policy strategy. Sheik 
Hamad’s policies have made Qatar an influential regional actor. In order for Qatar to 
maintain its niche, it needs to continue its support of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar not only 
balances itself between Saudi Arabia and Iran but also between conservative monarchies and 
Islamist parties, which makes Qatar critical with any discussions between these actors. If 
Qatar were to abandon the MB, the country may essentially return to being vassal of Saudi 
Arabia, much like Bahrain.  
 Saudi Arabia turned against the MB because it viewed the Islamist organization as a 
political and ideological threat. Qatar, in contrast, does not view the MB as an internal threat. 
The Qatar branch of the Muslim Brotherhood dissolved itself in 1999 because they felt the 
Qatar regime was already acting in within the MB’s guidelines. As a result, the MB in Qatar 
has focused outwardly. Qatar did not have the Sahwa unlike Saudi Arabia and thus did not 
have any internal pressure from the MB to reform. 
 Internationally, Qatar was also not concerned with the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
political gains following the Arab uprisings of 2011. Qatar had in fact backed the MB in 
many of these countries but recognized that the MB had secured power democratically 
through elections and not by revolutionary overthrow. Saudi Arabia and its allies were 
concerned that the rapid gains of MB were a troubling sign that the MB had been plotting all 
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along to seize power. Qatar, however, stood at the Muslim Brotherhood’s side arguing the 
MB had legitimately come to power.  
 The Qatar regime takes the Muslim Brotherhood at face value: an Islamist 
organization that pushes for democratic and social reform. This is in stark contrast to the 
Saudi point of view: a dangerous Islamist group seeking to topple the regimes of the Middle 
East purely for their own gain. The result of these conflicting views, which are not rooted in 
sectarianism, was the 2017 Gulf Crisis, as has been argued throughout this paper. Now that 
the relationships between the Muslim Brotherhood and these two countries have been 
established, this paper now turns to an analysis to see how these contrasting views of the 






 The previous two chapters explained the current state of affairs between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia and Qatar at the country level of analysis. The purpose of this 
chapter is to test what relationship exists at the individual level between the people of the 
Middle East and the Muslim Brotherhood. Ideally, data would have been collected on Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar to match the previous case studies, but such data was not obtainable for this 
paper. Instead, this paper uses data from other Arab countries of the Middle East and North 
Africa using data from the Arab Barometer IV (ABIV) survey. The results of this analysis 
will still provide insight into the view of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East and the 
organization’s connection to views on democracy. If the results can be taken broadly, they 
could even be applied to Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Some speculation may be necessary, but 
the results of this analysis can display what kind of threat, if any, the MB poses to the Saudi 
regime. The following tests primarily look at the democratic/political aspect of this threat, 
but future studies could look at the ideological side as explained in chapter three. Overall, 
this analysis aids in understanding what factors, beyond sectarianism, contributed to the 2017 
Gulf Crisis.  
 
Theory 
Many governments of the Middle East have shown skepticism towards the Muslim 
Brotherhood in recent years. The UAE’s distrust for the MB has been a driver for its foreign 
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policy since the start of the Arab Spring in 2011.90 Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and 
Egypt designated the organization as a terrorist group in 2014, a sign from the government 
that the Islamist organization should not be trusted.91 Jordan has yet to criminalize the MB, 
but the Jordanian government has moved in line with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, even 
arresting MB members critical of the UAE in late 2014.92 Citizens of these countries who 
trust and support the government are likely to believe these reports and in turn not trust the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Additionally, citizens who trust in the MB will not believe these 
official reports and have a more difficult time trusting the government. For Hypothesis 1, this 
paper will test this position: 
H1: The more trustful individuals are towards the Muslim Brotherhood, the less trustful 
they are of the government. 
 Whether there is a relationship between a citizen’s trust in the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the government is one thing, but another issue to understand is why certain governments 
of the Middle East do not trust the Muslim Brotherhood. The mistrust of Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt towards the Muslim Brotherhood could be a result of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s association with democracy, which poses a threat to the authoritarian 
regimes.93 Two questions need to be addressed. First, is there reason to believe that there is a 
relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and democracy? The Muslim Brotherhood 
does have a history of participating in democratic elections and promoting democratic 
reform.94 As noted before, the MB originally was not a democratic political party, but during 
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the 1940s, the organization fully embraced elections.95 The structure of the Muslim 
Brotherhood itself also has democratic elements. The Shura Council, the hundred-member 
legislative body of the organization, elects the General Guide, or the chief executive, by 
majority vote. While the Egyptian Brotherhood was in exile, this process rarely occurred as 
MB leaders could not organize elections, but since 2004, the MB has followed these 
guidelines.96  
Second, do individuals who view democracy as an appropriate form of government 
trust in the Muslim Brotherhood? Democracy is not widespread throughout the Middle East, 
but the Muslim Brotherhood is one of the few regional organizations that actively promote 
democracy in the region. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has often allied with other pro-
democratic factions.97 Affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood in other Middle Eastern 
countries, such as Tunisia, Jordan, Libya, and Morocco, have also been active participants of 
democratic elections.98 Broadly, across the Middle East, the MB has displayed 
trustworthiness in regards to democracy. To formalize, there is likely a positive relationship 
between an individual’s view on democracy and the MB: 
H2: Individuals who would accept democracy have greater trust in the Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
 If there is indeed a positive relationship between an individual’s thoughts on 
democracy and their trust in the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the Middle East that could 
explain Saudi Arabia’s (and other authoritarian countries) own mistrust towards the Islamist 
organization. 
                                                 
95 El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” 377. 
96 El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” 377. 
97 El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” 390. 




 Survey data is the most appropriate way to test these individual-level hypotheses. 
Although polling data, in general, can have issues with participants answering questions in a 
variety of biased ways, such as selecting answers based on societal norms and not what they 
personally think, surveys still offer the most direct measure for individual-level data.  This 
analysis uses data from the Arab Barometer IV (ABIV) survey.99 Arab Barometer conducted 
this survey between 2016 and 2017 in 7 countries/territories: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and 
Tunisia. ABIV surveyed twelve 
hundred people from each country 
with six hundred Syrian nationals 
living in Jordan and Lebanon 
included. In total, the ABIV 
surveyed nine thousand individuals 
on a variety of topics.  
 Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regressions were used for 
this analysis. The primary dependent variable for this analysis is the level of trust an 
individual has towards the government. This variable was measured by using a survey 
question from the ABIV that asked participants how much trust they have in the government 
(Council of Ministers). The survey gave participants four options (“no trust at all,” “not very 
much trust,” “quite a lot of trust,” and “a great deal of trust”) which were transformed into a 
                                                 




four-point scale with 4 being the highest amount of trust and 1 being the lowest. Figure 2 
shows the distribution of this variable, while 8.4% of those surveyed (or 753 participants) 
declined to answer or did not respond.  
 The primary independent variable is the level of trust an individual has towards the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The ABIV used the same format to ask participants how much they 
trusted the Muslim Brotherhood, which was similarly transformed. A slight complication 
with the data is that the ABIV only asked the MB question in Algeria, Morocco, Palestine, 
and Tunisia. Although not 
devastating to this study, this limits 
the number of observations 
available and the scope of any 
conclusions. Figure 3 shows the 
distribution of this variable, with 
9.1% of participants from the four 
surveyed countries declining to 
answer (437 individuals). 
As a result, an alternative 
test was used for a broader outlook on the Middle East. No other question in the ABIV 
specifically asked about the participant’s feelings towards the Muslim Brotherhood. 
However, a question asked if the participant felt anger towards Islamic parties and 
movements. The survey once again gave four options (“I strongly disagree,” “I disagree,” “I 
agree,” and “I strongly agree”). This data was also recoded so that participants who felt the 
most anger towards Islamist parties (strongly agreed) were coded as 4 and those who felt the 
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least anger (strongly disagreed) were coded as 1. ABIV did not ask this question in Palestine, 
but its inclusion still limits the amount of dropped observations. Figure 4 shows the 
distribution of this variable with 9.1% of those surveyed declining to respond (710 
individuals). 
It is difficult to make a direct comparison between the first test (using trust in the 
Muslim Brotherhood as the primary independent variable) and the second test (using anger 
towards Islamist parties as the primary independent variable) for two reasons. First, the two 
questions are surveying two 
different concepts: trust and 
anger. Naturally, an 
individual’s internal “scale” 
for trust and anger may be 
different, so a one-degree 
increase in trust may not be the 
same as a one-degree decrease 
in anger. Second, the two 
questions ask about two 
different entities: the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist parties in general. While the Muslim 
Brotherhood may be the best-known Islamist party among the surveyed countries, there are a 
number of other Islamist parties that exist. An individual who trusts the Muslim Brotherhood 
may still be angry at Hamas’s use of violence against Israel. Additionally, there is only a 
small correlation between these two variables.100 
                                                 
100 Using the Spearman method, the correlation between trust in the Muslim Brotherhood and anger towards 
Islamist parties in Algeria, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia is -0.217. 
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Despite the differences between these two variables, theoretically, they could have 
the same relationship with Trust in Government. Individuals who are angrier towards the MB 
and other Islamic parties may trust the negative reports of those organizations put out by the 
government, as explained for H1. For the reasons explained in the previous paragraph, the 
strength of the relationship between Anger towards Islamic Parties and Trust in Government 
is likely different from the relationship between Trust in the Muslim Brotherhood and Trust 
in the Government even if the direction is the same. Recall that the reason for using the 
Anger towards Islamist Parties 
variable is to utilize data from all of 
the surveyed countries, limiting 
dropped observations. 
To test H2, a measure for the 
respondents view on democracy was 
necessary. The ABIV asked 
participants, on a scale from 0 to 10, 
how appropriate they thought 
democracy is for their country. This 
variable, appropriateness of democracy, will be the primary independent variable for H2 
with trust in the Muslim Brotherhood and trust in the government as the dependent variables, 
respectively. Figure 5 shows the distribution, while 12.7% of surveyed participants declined 
to answer (1143 individuals). 
Control variables were also taken from the ABIV survey. Country data was taken 
from where the survey was conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
40 
 
Palestine, or Tunisia and was converted to a series of dummy variables. The 600 Syrians 
living in Jordan and Lebanon were included in their current country of residence. The age of 
the participants was also asked in the survey is included in this analysis. The variable male is 
a dummy variable to indicate gender with 1 being male. Muslim is an additional dummy 
variable for religion with 1 denoting the participant as being Muslim and 0 otherwise. In the 
survey, 8295 participants identified as Muslim while 705 indicated that they were Christian 
or other. No participants identified as Jewish. There was one question that asked individuals 
for their denomination, but the ABIV only asked this question in Lebanon. While it would be 
interesting to control for differences among Sunnis and Shi’as, too many observations would 
be dropped by only using data from Lebanon. For these reasons, these tests will only have 
one variable to indicate religion.  
Religiousness is a potentially insightful variable that, for example, could be related to 
the level of trust a participant has towards the Muslim Brotherhood. The ABIV asked how 
the participant would describe themselves as “not religious,” “somewhat religious,” or 
“religious.” This data was recoded on a scale with three being those who described 
themselves as religious and one being those who were not religious. 
The surveyors coded Urban as a dummy variable with one indicating participants 
who live in cities and zero otherwise. The income variable used a survey question that asked 
participants to choose one of four statements that best described their household income. 
These statements ranged from “our household income does not cover our expenses and we 
face significant difficulties in meeting our needs” to “our household income covers our 
expenses well and we are able to save.” This question was recoded onto a four-point scale, 
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with 1 being those who faced the most difficulties in covering expenses and 4 being the 
households which could comfortably cover expenses and save.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Minimum Maximum Mean Median NA’s 
Trust in Government 1 4 2.16 2 753 
Trust in Muslim Brotherhood 1 4 1.88 2 4637 
Anger Towards Islamic Parties 1 4 2.47 2 1910 
Appropriateness of Democracy 0 10 5.72 6 1143 
Age 18 95 39.7 38 4 
Male 0 1 0.50 0 0 
Muslim 0 1 0.92 1 0 
Religiousness 1 3 2.25 2 48 
Urban 0 1 0.68 1 460 
Income 1 4 2.31 2 91 
Algeria 0 1 0.13 0 0 
Egypt 0 1 0.13 0 0 
Jordan 0 1 0.17 0 0 
Lebanon 0 1 0.17 0 0 
Morocco 0 1 0.13 0 0 
Palestine 0 1 0.13 0 0 
Tunisia 0 1 0.13 0 0 
No Formal Education 0 1 0.12 0 0 
Elementary 0 1 0.16 0 0 
Prepatory 0 1 0.18 0 0 
Secondary 0 1 0.30 0 0 
BA 0 1 0.21 0 0 
MA 0 1 0.04 0 0 
 
Finally, the education variable contains six different levels of education: no formal 
education, elementary, preparatory, secondary, Bachelor of Arts, and Master of Arts and 
above. This question was changed to a series of dummy variables for each level of education. 
The ABIV asked a slightly different version of this question in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and 
Palestine that included an option for “mid-level diploma/professional or technical.” For 
coding purposes, participants that selected this option are included at the secondary level of 





 The results of the first two OLS regressions are presented in Table 2. Model 1 
uses Trust in the Muslim Brotherhood as the primary dependent variable while Model 2 uses 
Anger towards Islamist Parties. Both models have Trust in the Government as the dependent 
variable.  
Table 2: Regressions with Trust in Government as Dependent Variable 
  (1)  (2) 
Variable Name Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 1.778*** 0.224 1.652*** 0.101 
Trust in Muslim Brotherhood 0.364*** 0.014 - - 
Anger towards Islamic Parties - - -0.053*** 0.011 
Age 0.005*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.001 
Male -0.100*** 0.028 -0.083*** 0.024 
Religiousness -0.004 0.023 0.087*** 0.020 
Muslim -0.455* 0.202 0.198*** 0.050 
Urban -0.055 0.031 -0.072** 0.026 
Income 0.108*** 0.016 0.146*** 0.014 
Algeria -0.096* 0.041 -0.123** 0.043 
Egypt - - 0.820*** 0.044 
Jordan - - 0.326*** 0.044 
Lebanon - - -0.562*** 0.048 
Morocco 0.041 .040 0.140** 0.044 
Palestine -0.106* 0.043 - - 
Tunisia - - - - 
No Formal Education - - - - 
Elementary -0.141** 0.054 -0.225*** 0.049 
Prepatory -0.240*** 0.059 -0.309*** 0.052 
Secondary -0.344*** 0.058 -0.340*** 0.049 
BA -0.267*** 0.060 -0.466*** 0.052 
MA and Above -0.142 0.081 -0.239*** 0.072 
* significance level ≤ 0.05 
** significance level ≤ 0.01 
*** significance level ≤ 0.001 
4,083 Observations 6,365 Observations 
The results of Model 1 show that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between trust in the MB and the government among participants. This correlation goes 
against the predicted relationship of Hypothesis 1, which stated that there would be a 
negative relationship between the two variables. Model 2 additionally shows a negative 
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relationship between anger towards Islamist parties and trust in the government. Recall that 
the anger variable is essentially the inverse of the trust variable so the negative relationship is 
in line with the results of Model 1. With either measure, there is a clear and significant 
relationship so the null hypotheses of H1 can also not be accepted. 
Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon in Model 1 and Palestine in Model 2 are excluded 
because those countries were not included in the measure of their respective dependent 
variable. Tunisia is excluded as a reference category for the country controls in both models 
while No Formal Education is left out as a reference category for education.  
Table 2 shows that a positive and significant relationship exists between Trust in the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Trust in the Government which goes against the predicted 
relationship in H1. These results potentially provide evidence that even if individuals (in 
Saudi Arabia or elsewhere) trust the messages of the Muslim Brotherhood as sent through Al 
Jazeera they still have a lot of trust in the government. It is reasonable to expect that a group 
of individuals who trust the government do not pose a revolutionary threat to the regime, as 
the Saudi’s fear from supporters of the MB. 
Individuals who have a broad trust in all institutions could potentially drive the 
positive relationship between Trust in the Muslim Brotherhood and Trust in the Government. 
Additionally, individuals who have a general distrust in institutions, which would normally 
serve to counterbalance, may have declined to take the survey altogether. These individuals 
could see the survey’s as agents of some institution (whether the government or otherwise) 
and refused to take part in the survey. Unfortunately, this issue is tricky to resolve because of 
the nature of poll-based data, which relies on the self-selection and self-evaluation of 
participants. However, Figures 2 and 3 do show a large numbers of participants reporting that 
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they do not have any trust in the Government or the MB (the most out of any response) so 
there does appear to be a substantial sample of mistrusting individuals. Overall, there is little 
evidence that trust cannot be shared between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government 
among individuals. 
Model 2 additionally shows a negative and significant relationship between Anger 
towards Islamic Parties. Recall that a negative coefficient with Anger towards Islamic 
Parties is actually in line with a positive coefficient with Trust in the Muslim Brotherhood 
because of how each variable was measured. If Model 1 instead used mistrust in the Muslim 
Brotherhood as an independent variable, then the direction of the two coefficients would 
have been the same. In summary, there is evidence that individuals who are angrier towards 
Islamic parties are also less trusting of the government. Additionally, Anger towards Islamic 
Parties appears to have a much smaller effect on Trust in Government than Trust in the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Once again, model 2 potentially provides evidence that individuals can 
be supportive of both the MB and the government. Perhaps in Saudi Arabia the same is true; 
people who are not angry towards Islamic parties (such as the MB) still trust the government 
and would not overthrow the regime. 
Hypotheses 2 deals with a new variable: the Appropriateness of Democracy. Table 3 
displays the results of two additional OLS regressions. Model 3 uses Trust in the Muslim 
Brotherhood as the dependent variable while Model 4 uses Trust in the Government. Model 3 
tests H2 while Model 4 is an additional test to see the relationship between an individual’s 





Table 3: Regressions on the Appropriateness of Democracy 
 (3) 
Trust in the Muslim 
Brotherhood 
(4) 
Trust in the 
Government 
Variable Name Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 0.735** 0.250 1.321*** 0.094 
Appropriateness of 
Democracy 
0.046*** 0.006 0.067*** 0.004 
Age 0.000 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 
Male -0.044 0.032 -0.065** 0.022 
Religiousness 0.159*** 0.026 0.081*** 0.018 
Muslim 0.397 0.223 0.174*** 0.048 
Urban -0.017 0.035 -0.062* 0.024 
Income 0.102*** 0.018 0.117*** 0.013 
Algeria -0.160*** 0.046 -0.151*** 0.042 
Egypt - - 0.775*** 0.042 
Jordan - - 0.252*** 0.042 
Lebanon - - -0.668*** 0.047 
Morocco 0.233*** 0.048 0.026 0.043 
Palestine 0.162*** 0.048 -0.041 0.043 
Tunisia - - - - 
No Formal Education - - - - 
Elementary -0.088 0.064 -0.147** 0.047 
Prepatory -0.206** 0.069 -0.268*** 0.048 
Secondary -0.118 0.067 -0.285*** 0.046 
BA -0.221** 0.070 -0.378*** 0.049 
MA and Above -0.121 0.093 -0.174* 0.068 
* significance level ≤ 0.05 
**significance level ≤ 0.01 
***significance level ≤ 0.001 
3,879 Observations 7,485 Observations 
The results in Table 3 show a positive and significate relationship between 
Appropriateness of Democracy and Trust in the Muslim Brotherhood in line with H2. In 
addition, Model 4 shows a positive relationship between Appropriateness of Democracy and 
Trust in the Government. The results of Model 3 were what was expected, and the test 
provides evidence that those accept democracy also trust in the Muslim Brotherhood. If this 
relationship is true throughout the Middle East, then the Saudi’s hostility towards the Muslim 
Brotherhood could be a result of this association with democracy rather than viewing the MB 
as direct ideological or political revolutionary threat. Model 4 further shows that individuals 
who do find democracy appropriate also have increased trust in the government. Should any 
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country feel threatened by a particular group of citizens who do trust the government? This 
paper will not address this question, but there does seem to be little reason for the Saudi 
government to be hostile towards the Muslim Brotherhood besides its association with 
democracy. 
Overall, these tests provide evidence of a connection between an individual’s view of 
democracy and the Muslim Brotherhood and those individuals can trust both the government 
and the Muslim Brotherhood. These tests are far from comprehensive but do offer insight at 
the potential role of democracy and the MB, and not necessarily sectarianism, in causing 






 The June 2017 Gulf Crisis demonstrates the complexity of international politics in the 
Middle East. The crisis, primarily between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, cannot be explained 
solely as a sectarian confrontation. In order to understand the 2017 Gulf Crisis, this paper 
studied the role of the Muslim Brotherhood.  As demonstrated with two case studies, Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar have a long history with the Islamist organization. Relations between Saudi 
Arabia and the MB are currently tense because the MB’s own brand of Islamism and the 
MB’s pro-democratic stance poses a threat to the Saudi autocratic regime. Qatar and the MB 
are currently on good terms because of Qatar’s current foreign policy goal to become a 
global actor. The Muslim Brotherhood’s connections and influence throughout the Middle 
East and the world are critical to Qatar’s strategy. Additionally, as there is no local branch of 
the MB in Qatar, there is little threat of a religious or political domestic conflict with the 
Islamist organization.  
Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have domestic concerns to keep in mind when 
conducting foreign policy that go beyond sectarianism. The quantitative analysis, 
additionally, provided the connection between the Muslim Brotherhood and democracy at the 
individual level. The analysis might suggest that there is little reason for Middle Eastern 
regimes to distrust the Muslim Brotherhood besides their connection to democracy.  
Clearly, the conflict of interest over the MB between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in part 
sparked the 2017 Gulf Crisis. Following the Arab Spring, interest in the Persian Gulf region 
increased studies but primarily focused on sectarianism. Studying the causes and effects of 
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sectarianism is important to the understanding of conflict in the Middle East, but scholars 
should not ignore other areas of study. Studying the Muslim Brotherhood increases the 
understanding of how democracy, domestic legitimacy, and internal security are related to 
the crises of this region. 
 The primary focus of this paper was exploring the divergent views of Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar towards the Muslim Brotherhood, but future works could expand on this list of 
case studies. Obviously, the MB’s history with Egypt comes to mind, which was explored 
partly in Chapter 2. Additionally, the UAE, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen, among others, are all 
countries that have a complex history with the Muslim Brotherhood. Future studies on any of 
these countries would complement the findings of this paper. 
 While this paper utilized data from the most recent wave of the Arab Barometer, 
future studies could more directly test the proposed hypotheses within Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar. Survey data within both countries is sparse but a proper poll on Saudi and Qatari 
opinions towards the government, democracy, and the Muslim Brotherhood would be a 
valuable addition to the literature. The Arab Barometer allowed for a general look at trends in 
the Middle East, but surveys from the two primary actors of the 2017 Gulf Crisis would 
likely prove insightful. 
 This paper focused on the Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in the 2017 Gulf 
Crisis, which admittedly does not capture the totality of this crisis. Future studies on the 2017 
Gulf Crisis and Gulf politics, in general, should not ignore the multifaceted nature of this 
crisis which involves sectarianism and Brotherhood but also economics, geopolitics, relations 
with the U.S. and Iran, and other issues. This paper served as an introduction to one of the 
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